Though the shortage is real, the right solution is not to coerce the states to surrender a large number of their officers to the Centre.
Unfortunately, IAS officers working for their entire career in the states hardly come across people who can inspire them either ethically or intellectually. They are surrounded by politicians, traders and similar other people seeking due or undue favours. Desire to learn and improve performance is limited in the states. Their knowledge of how other Indian states are performing is negligible. Gradually they lose their all-India outlook, develop provincial mindset, and end up as any other state service bureaucracy.
However, the right solution is not to coerce the states to surrender a large number of their officers to the Centre. The medium-term solution is of course to gradually increase the annual recruitment of IAS officers from 180 to 220 so as to meet the present shortage of about 1,700 IAS officers in the country. But what is it that GOI can do in the short run besides lateral entry?
First, the number of Central deputation reserve for each cadre should be reduced from the present figure of 40% to 15%, but it should be reviewed every three years and only gradually increased. Second, the states should seek consent of the officers willing to serve the Centre, but in case their number is below 15%, it should offer even unwilling officers, especially those with nine to 15 years of seniority, to GOI, as it would be in their own interest to widen their knowledge by serving the Centre.
Should the Centre have powers to force a state to release a particular officer to serve the Centre, as is being sought by another proposed amendment to Rule 6(1) of the Cadre Rules? This amounts to arm-twisting the states and is prone to malafide political harassment of individual officers, especially those working in non-BJP states. They would be reluctant to take any decision against the wishes of the political party in power at the Centre for fear of being summarily transferred to the Centre and harassed there. This fear psychosis would destroy the morale and neutrality of upright IAS officers, and make them subservient to the party ruling the Centre, even while they are serving a state. One is reminded of how GOI asked Alapan Bandyopadhyay, former chief secretary of West Bengal, to report to the Centre a few days before he was to retire from the IAS without even consulting the state, just because his conduct did not please the BJP.
The experience of the last eight years shows that rather than focusing on systemic reforms to make the bureaucracy more effective, the BJP government since 2014 has aggressively promoted a patronage-based administrative culture. Driven by obsessive furtherance of their ideology at any cost, the BJP government’s actions have systematically hollowed out the steel frame of India, especially the police. The administration of this vast, complex country requires real professional skills and not just agreeability or the carrying out of commands.
However, one should not forget that in the past, even in some states the political executive has treated upright IAS officers with a degree of brutality. One is reminded of Durga Shakti Nagpal who in 2013 took strong action against the ‘sand-mafia’ in Greater Noida, but the Uttar Pradesh government rewarded her with suspension because she was not allowing the ruling Samajwadi Party bigwigs to run mining business on riverbed.
Should in such cases GOI be authorised to take these officers on Central deputation even without state’s approval?
Civil society and academics need to debate this issue. My own take is that in exceptional cases not exceeding 1% of the cadre strength (with a maximum of three officers), GOI should be permitted to take such officers on deputation even without the state’s approval, but the officer’s consent should be mandatory. At present the proposed amendment to the Cadre Rules does away with consent of both, the state government and the officer concerned, and empowers GOI to pick up any officer from the state, thus totally destroying the federal character of the service. The Central government’s powers and capacity to harm, harass and torment a non-compliant IAS officer is far more than that of states, and it can impose major penalty including dismissal. An autocratic government can even summarily dismiss an IAS officer without inquiry by invoking Article 311 of the constitution.
To sum up, while posting all-India service officers to the Centre, approval of the state government should not be done away with. However, the percentage of such officers on offer to the Centre should be enhanced from the present low figure of roughly 8% to 15% of the cadre strength, even if it means including the names of a few unwilling officers. Only in exceptional cases, GOI should be allowed to pick up an individual officer without the state’s approval, provided the officer has consented to such an offer.
Naresh Chandra Saxena is a former member of the Planning Commission.
